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The apparent difficulty people have with making Bayesian inferences has been researched heavily over the past 25 years,
with conflicting explanations regarding the causes of and the cures for this inadequacy. Some researchers have improved
Bayesian reasoning by representing the problem visually, but usually as a tool to teach Bayesian reasoning skills. This
research examines facilitating reasoning performance in naïve Bayesian subjects without attempting to teach Bayesian
reasoning skills. This approach is more relevant for everyday decision support situations where subjects do not or need not
possess knowledge of Bayes theorem (naïve subjects). Several different visual representations (VRs) will be examined to
determine which visualization technique generates the best decision performance. For this specific problem, certain
visualization representations (VRs) may reveal the problem structure better than others, improving decision making,
regardless of the whether number is represented as a natural frequency or a probability. VRs should be stable with regard to
different base rates and reference class sizes. Using dual processing theories of cognition, this research will explain other
aspects of this judgment task, including how users create and choose their strategies in solving this task and why subjects
may have low levels of confidence in their results yet exhibit high task performance. Hopefully this research will help paint a
clearer picture of the best ways for decision support systems to represent information in Bayesian inference tasks to naïve
subjects and how VRs can enhance naïve subject performance in a variety of judgment and decision making tasks.
Keywords
Information visualization, Bayesian reasoning, judgment, natural frequencies, decision making, uncertainty, base-rate
neglect, dual processing theories
INTRODUCTION
Information visualization techniques are frequently used in decision support systems, under the notion, usually presumed,
that visualization improves decision making. Research from other disciplines is painting a more complex and subtle
relationship between how a problem is represented and how people make judgments and decisions. In this research, we focus
on VRs for a specific and well-researched problem, the “mammography problem,” which asks subjects to infer a probability.
The problem text, (from Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995) reads as follows:
The probability of breast cancer is 1% for women at age forty who participate in routine screening. If a
woman has breast cancer, the probability is 80% that she will get a positive mammography. If a woman
does not have breast cancer, the probability is 9.6% that she will also get a positive mammography. A
woman in this age group had a positive mammography in a routine screening. What is the probability that
she actually has breast cancer?
The normative answer requires applying a form of Bayes’ theorem to calculate the posterior probability that a woman with
positive results has cancer. The symbols H and –H denote the two hypotheses (cancer and no cancer, respectively) and D
denotes the data representing the positive test results. The formula for computing p(H | D) is:
( ) ( | )
( | )
( ) ( | ) ( ) ( | )
p H p D H
p H D








Prior research indicates subject accuracy is typically poor for the text-only probability version of the problem (Gigerenzer &
Edwards, 2003; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995; Girotto & Gonzalez, 2001; Kurzenhauser & Hoffrage, 2002; Sedlmeier, 2000;
Sloman, Over, Slovak, & Stibel, 2003).
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PRIOR RESEARCH GOALS
Most of the research on this particular problem has had one of two goals: to improve subjects Bayesian reasoning skills
through training or to understand how subjects make Bayesian, or equivalent, judgments. A few studies treat the visual
representation as an interactive tool, typically to teach Bayesian reasoning (Cole, 1989; Sedlmeier, 2000), while others use it
as a non-interactive tool in conjunction with a textual version of the problem (Sloman et al., 2003). Cole (1989) is perhaps the
only study that compares different visual representations, but his was focused on teaching Bayesian reasoning, not in
improving performance in naïve subjects.
The list of textual and visual representations discussed or tested in the body of research on this problem includes:
contingency tables (Cole,  1989), trees (Martignon & Wassner, 2002), frequency bars or “beam cut” (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage,
1995), Euler circles (Sloman et al., 2003), signal detection, probability curves (Cole, 1989; Meuser, Cowan & Meuser, 1999),
frequency grids (Cole, 1989; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995) and Bayesian boxes (Burns, 2004). Figures 1 through 6 show
some of the VRs this research will examine.
NATURAL FREQUENCIES AND BAYESIAN INFERENCE
Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995) have argued that representing this problem as natural frequencies rather than as probabilities
improves subjects’ performance. Natural frequencies (Figure 7) arise from natural sampling and are not normalized with
respect to base rates (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1999). Natural sampling is the process of encountering instances in a
population sequentially – in other words, as human beings normally encounter observations in their lives. Citing Cosmides &
Tooby (1996), Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995) propose that evolution has given us minds that can reason with natural
frequencies better than probabilities.
Several authors have suggested, that for problems like this one, certain representations reveal the problem’s hidden set
structure making the solution easier to obtain (Evans, Handley, Perham, Over, & Thompson, 2000; Girotto & Gonzalez,
2001; Mellers & McGraw, 1999). This particular problem has a three-part nested set structure of interest – women who are
regularly screened, women who test positive for the disease and women who have the disease. Once the set structure becomes
clear, subjects can assign values to the appropriate subset and compute a correct answer.
A well-known natural frequency version of the problem, from Gigerenzer & Hoffrage (1995), is as follows:
10 out of every 1,000 woman at age forty who participate in routine screening have breast cancer.
8 out of every 10 women with breast cancer will also get a positive mammograhy. 95 out of every
990 women without breast cancer will also get a positive mammograhy. Here is a new
representative sample of 100 women at age forty who got a positive mammography in a routine
screening. How many of these women do you expect to actually have breast cancer?
When presented with natural frequencies, subjects can more easily compute the correct answer, shown below:
& 8
( | ) 0.078
& & 8 95
d h
p H D
d h d h
= = =
+ − +
The terms d & h are the number of cases with the symptom and the disease and d & -h is the number of cases having the
symptoms but lacking the disease. Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, (1995) identify three relevant reasons natural frequencies simplify
this problem: 1) natural frequencies are computationally simpler (as we just saw); 2) natural frequencies reduce attentional
demands since only two pieces of information need to be considered, d&h and d&-h; 3) base rates (e.g., 10 out of 1,000) can
be ignored, since the natural frequency information preserves the base rate information within the frequencies.
The frequency versus probability debate
Over the past decade, a rather vigorous debate concerning the effect natural frequencies have on performance of Bayesian
inference problems has ensued. The points of the debate relevant to visual representations include properly defining what is a
natural frequency; single-case versus aggregate cases representation; identification of the nested sets; common versus rare
events; the size of the reference class and the how much natural frequencies facilitate Bayesian inference.
Some of the debate has identified different interpretations of the term natural frequencies. Simply putting a numeric value in
terms of frequencies versus probabilities (e.g., 3 out of 100 versus a 0.03 probability) does not make it a natural frequency
nor does it give it the benefits of natural frequencies (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1999).  Evans et al. (2000) and Sloman et al.
(2003) argue that it is by revealing nested set relationships that frequency formats yield better performance. Gigerenzer &
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Edwards (2003) state that natural frequencies (aggregate cases) make the reference class clear where as single event
probability representations (single cases) leave it open to interpretation.
Natural frequencies may not always yield better performance. Mellers and McGraw (1999) indicates that frequency formats
facilitate Bayesian reasoning only with rare events. Brase (2002) points out that prior research has suggested that when
making judgments about populations of people, subjects are sensitive to population sizes, with subjects giving more
normative answers for small reference class sizes (less than 100). Judgment might be better when subjects deal with scales
that align with typical human experience.
Both sides of the aisle seem to agree that once the reference class and the nested sets are clear, the problem is more easily
solved. This research expects that visual representations do better than natural frequency text representations in making the
problem structure clear (reference class and nested set relationships) and hypothesizes that when good VRs are used, whether
the numbers are a natural frequency or probability form should not matter. Since base rates and reference class sizes are
encoded visually as proportions, VRs should be stable regardless of the reference class size and rarity of the event.
DUAL PROCESSING AND JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING
According to dual-processing theory, the human mind is comprised of two distinct cognitive systems underlying thought.
Evans et al. (2003) consider system 1 as comprising implicit, domain-specific neural networks reflecting the learning history
of the individual, but also including innate or automatic modules. System 2, the explicit system, is uniquely human and
linked to language and reflective consciousness (Evans et al, 2003). Stanovich & West (2000), and others, including
Kahneman (2002), Sloman (2002) and Hogarth (2002), use dual-process theories of reasoning as possible interpretations for
explaining base rate neglect and other errors in Bayesian inference. While details of the dual process theories explained by
various researchers are not identical, some agreement exists. Table 1 describes the two systems (Stanovich & West, 2000).




Relatively undemanding of cognitive capacity Demanding of cognitive capacity
Relatively fast Relatively slow
Highly contextualized task construal Decontextualized task construal
Conversational and socialized task construal Asocial task construal
Table 1. Dual processing and judgment and decision making
In problem solving situations, the two systems cue different responses and most likely interact or cooperate with each other in
generating a response (Stanovich & West, 2000; Sloman, 2002). In McElroy & Seta (2003, 2004) studies that examined
framing effects and dual-processing theory, they confirmed some aspects of dual processing theory: a) when task relevancy is
high, system 2 is better engaged leading to more normative answers; b) users with an extremely analytic style as measured by
the Zenhausen (1978) preference test generate more normative answers; c) hemispheres of the brain corresponding to system
1 and 2 influence the normative answer and can be manipulated to interfere with normative answers generated by system 2.
This research proposes that the processing of VRs in Bayesian inference problems involves cooperation between these two
systems. VRs may facilitate improved judgment performance by engaging the context-specific, pre-attentive system 1 with
visual cues that help subjects identify the reference class and the nested set relationships. VRs can give stronger system 2
cues (through system 1 pre-attentive processing) than textual natural frequencies facilitating performance. Task relevancy
may  also  have  much  to  do  in  explaining  the  impact  VRs  have  on  decision  making.  VRs  should  have  a  greater  impact  in
improving judgment accuracy for tasks with lower relevancy. Because VRs may engage system 1 in stronger ways than do
text representations, VRs may inhibit generation of multiple strategies from which subjects select, reducing problem solving
time. In keeping with the information processing approach to judgment and decision making and its relationship to dual
processing theory (Payne & Bettman, 2004), by engaging system 1 in the judgment task, VRs may reduce cognitive effort by
reducing or eliminating strategy selection. When VRs are used, whether natural frequencies or probabilities are used should
not matter. The visual cues are used by System 1 to constrain generation of System 2 strategies, surpassing the benefit natural
frequencies may provide.
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PROPOSED RESEARCH AGENDA
While this particular problem and others like it have been heavily researched, more needs to be understood. This research will
examine the effectiveness of several visual representations in enhancing performance on this problem for naïve Bayesian





This research will compare text and visual representations of the mammography problem. Results from this study can be
compared with prior studies and the impact VRs have on task performance will be compared with the textual manipulations
of the problem. This research will use process tracing techniques in a laboratory setting to determine which strategies
subjects select from and use to solve this Bayesian inference problem and whether frequency formats or VRs have the greater
influence on judgment speed and accuracy.
Based on dual processing theories and prior research into Bayesian inference problems, effective VRs should
• Make the reference class and nested set relationships pre-attentively transparent thereby helping subjects establish
their problem solving strategy with fewer strategy shifts detected
• Increase judgment speed and accuracy regardless of the numeric format (frequency versus probability)
• Be robust enough to work well regardless of the rarity of the event (different base rates) and the size of the reference
class
VRs may facilitate other classic judgment and decision problems, including mitigating framing effects and conjunctive
probability errors; overcoming violations of stochastic dominance and other non-Bayesian selection of gambles; and reducing
overconfidence in planning. The author argues that dual processing theories provide a better explanation for how VRs
contribute to Bayesian inference in naïve subjects than do natural frequency, nested sets, information processing, or mental
model explanations. Information and decision support systems may need to expand their repertoire of visualization
techniques to include ones that can reduce judgment and decision bias through proper engagement of System 1.
Figure 1. Frequency bar
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Figure 2. Euler circle
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Figure 6. Frequency tree
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Figure 7. Contingency tables
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